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INTRODUCTION 
 
Only one thing is impossible for God: To find any 
sense in any copyright law on the planet – Mark Twain, 
American Author 
 
Copyright is a type of intellectual property that is granted 
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression.”1  In Garcia v. Google Inc.,2 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“the Ninth Circuit”) 
improperly held that Cindy Lee Garcia (“Garcia”), an ordained 
Christian minister turned aspiring actress, was “likely to 
prevail”3 on a copyright claim for authorship of the 
controversial trailer for Innocence of Muslims (“the Film”), 
which she appeared in for a mere five seconds as a supporting 
 
 1.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2014). 
 2.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., et al., 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d 766 F.3d 
929. 
 3.  Id. at 935. 
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actress.4  The Garcia opinion, as it stood prior to an en banc 
opinion that reversed the Ninth Circuit, threatened to create a 
new category of copyright interest that transforms a motion 
picture, which is a unitary work, into a patchwork of 
overlapping property claims.5  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision created uncertainty and increased liability for 
companies engaged in content streaming. 
This Comment will begin with an overview of United 
States Copyright law, focusing on authorship requirements 
and rights of owners.6  Next, this Comment will discuss the 
background of Garcia,7 the Ninth Circuit’s original holding and 
en banc reversal,8 and an analysis of the legal and business 
issues arising from that holding.9  This Comment will then 
propose a new test for analyzing whether an actor/actress 
should be declared an author of a motion picture based on his 
or her performance in said motion picture.10  This test places 
the burden upon the actor/actress to prove more than a 
minimal form of contribution to the motion picture and 
suggests an analysis of the following factors: (1) the role of the 
actor/actress within the motion picture; (2) the significance of 
that role within the motion picture; (3) the level of control and 
discretion afforded to the actor/actress in conveying his or her 
role; and (4) the level of control afforded to the actor/actress in 
production of the motion picture as a whole.  Lastly, the 
proposed test will be applied to three hypothetical authorship 
claims.11 
 
 4.  Although Garcia only appeared for five seconds, her appearance was 
arguably the most controversial.  See infra notes 121–22. 
 5.  Oral Argument at 20:30, Garcia v. Google Inc., et al., 766 F.3d 929 (9th 
Cir. 2014), available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_
id=0000000725 
 6.  See infra Part I.A–B. 
 7.  See infra Part I.C. 
 8.  See infra Part I.D–E.  The opinion at the center of this Comment is the 
Ninth Circuit’s original opinion, 796 F.3d 929.  Although the Ninth Circuit 
reversed its original opinion, making the issues raised in that opinion moot, the 
discussion of authorship in the context of motion pictures remains relevant and 
could be challenged in the future.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit is not the only 
circuit to have faced this issue.  See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, No. 13-
3865, 2015 WL 3937947 (2d Cir. June 29, 2015). 
 9.  See infra Part II–III. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 11.  See infra Part IV.B–D. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Historical Development of United States Copyright 
Law 
The evolution of copyright law in the United States is one 
of “gradual expansion”12 that begins with the Constitution and 
is followed by three important pieces of legislation. 
1. Constitutional Grant 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution (“the Copyright Clause”) empowers Congress: “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings.”13  The Supreme Court has identified the 
Copyright Clause as both a “grant of power and a limitation.”14  
To be deemed an author under the Copyright Clause, an 
individual must prove: (1) originality; and (2) some minimal 
degree of human intellectual labor or creativity.15  The term 
“Writings” is construed broadly to mean a tangible, physical 
embodiment of authorship.16  Copyright relief stems strictly 
from statutory authorization and not from a common law 
right.17 
2. 1790 Copyright Statue (“the 1790 Statute”) 
The first United States Copyright statute was enacted in 
1790 and was influenced primarily by the English Statute of 
Anne.18  The 1790 Statute granted copyright protection to 
maps, charts, and books for a term of fourteen years.19  
Congress slowly added various works to the 1790 Statute, 
including prints in 1802, musical compositions in 1831, 
dramatic compositions in 1856, photographs in 1865, and 
 
 12.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976). 
 13.  U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. 
of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)). 
 15.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  For 
a discussion of Feist and the originality element, see infra Part I.A.4.c. 
 16.  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
 17.  Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657–58, 661–62 (1834). 
 18.  Donald S. Chisum, Tyler T. Ochoa, Shubha Ghosh & Mary LaFrance, 
UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 256 (Matthew Bender & 
Company, Inc., 2nd ed. 2011). 
 19.  Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
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works of fine art in 1870.20 
3. Copyright Act of 1909 (“the 1909 Act”) 
The 1909 Act granted copyright to “all the writings of an 
author.”21  Unlike the broad constitutional interpretation of 
“Writings,”22 the term “writings” in the 1909 Act came with 
limitation.23  Section 5 of the 1909 Act listed eleven categories 
of copyrightable work, including, among others: books, 
periodicals, dramatic compositions, musical compositions, 
works of art, photographs, and pictorial illustrations.24  In 
1912, “motion picture photoplays” and “motion pictures other 
than photoplays” were incorporated into the 1909 Act.25  The 
1909 Act provided copyright protection for a term of twenty-
eight years, commencing upon publication, which could be 
renewed once for a total of fifty-six years.26 
Congress believed that awarding an exclusive right to an 
author for a limited time achieved the ultimate goal of 
fostering the growth of learning and culture for the public 
welfare.27  The 1976 Report of the Register of Copyrights, which 
was prepared in anticipation of the revisions ultimately 
enacted in the Copyright Act of 1976, argued that although 
public interest must coincide with authors’ rights, public 
interest nonetheless outweighs authors’ rights.28  The 1909 Act 
remains relevant today because it continues to govern 
copyrights that were obtained by publication or registration 
 
 20.  Margreth Barrett, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS 406 
(West Publishing Co., 4th ed. 1995). 
 21.  17 U.S.C. § 4 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)). 
 22.  See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 23.  Chisum, supra note 18, at 257. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Jay F. Dougherty, Not A Spike Lee Joint? Issues In The Authorship Of 
Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 233 (2001). 
 26.  17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909). 
 27.  See H.R. REP. NO. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 6–7 (1909) (recognizing 
that: “[t]he Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that Congress 
shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best.  Not primarily for the 
benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are 
given.  In enacting the copyright law Congress must consider . . . how much the 
monopoly granted will be detrimental to the public.”). 
 28.  See House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the 
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 90 
(Comm. Print 1961) (explaining an “author’s interests [must] coincide with those 
of the public.  Where they conflict, the public interest must prevail.”). 
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prior to 1978.29 
4. Copyright Act of 1976 (“the 1976 Act”) 
Under the 1976 Act, which governs most copyrights 
granted today, copyright exists in “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”30  The House 
Reports for the 1976 Act indicate that Congress purposely left 
undefined the phrase “original works of authorship.”31  Instead, 
Congress sought to maintain the standard of originality 
established by courts under the 1909 Act.32  Congress also 
recognized that authors would continue to find new ways of 
expressing themselves, and that the 1976 Act could not limit 
those expressive forms which may be discovered nor allow 
unlimited expansion.33 
The 1976 Act expressly preempted state copyright 
protection.34  The 1976 Act unified the law by extending federal 
copyright protection to both published and unpublished works, 
commencing on the date the work is fixed in tangible form.35  
Moreover, the 1976 Act replaced the former system of 
renewable copyright terms36 with a single term consisting of 
the life of the author plus fifty years.37 
a. Copyrightable Subject Matter  
Title 17 of the United States Code section 102(a) sets forth 
the following categories of copyrightable subject matter: (1) 
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying 
 
 29.  Some copyrights granted under the 1909 Act will continue until 
December 31, 2072, maintaining the 1909 Copyright Act’s relevance.  Thus, we 
should continue to consider the intent of the 1909 Act. 
 30.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 31.  H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 51 (“The phrase original works of authorship, 
which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the 
standard of originality established by the courts under the present copyright 
statue.  This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or 
aesthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright 
protection to require them”) (emphasis added). 
 32.  H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 51. 
 33.  H.R. REP. NO. 1576, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 51 (1976). 
 34.  See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301. 
 35.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 406–07. 
 36.  See supra note 26. 
 37.  See 17 U.S.C.A § 302.  A subsequent amendment extended the duration 
of the term to the life of the author plus 70 years, i.e., an additional twenty years.  
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-28, 12 
Stat. 2827. 
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words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural 
works.38  Title 17 of the United States Code section 102(b) also 
sets forth uncopyrightable subject matter, specifically “any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”39 
b. Fixation 
Title 17 of the United States Code section 101 states: “A 
work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecords . . . is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”40 
In the context of a motion picture, Congress noted that the 
content of a live transmission should be regarded as fixed and 
should be afforded statutory protection.41  However, Congress 
cautioned that fixation should exclude “purely evanescent or 
transient reproductions” such as images projected briefly on a 
screen, shown electronically on a television, or captured 
momentarily.42 
c. Originality 
Originality does not mean that a work is novel or unique.43  
Instead, originality means that the material originates from 
the purported author and is not copied.44  In Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,45 a Supreme Court case predating 
the 1976 Act that challenged the copyrightability of a 
photograph of Oscar Wilde, the Court held that photographs 
were copyrightable because “they are representatives of 
 
 38.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 41.  H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 52–53. 
 42.  H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 52–53. 
 43.  Doughtery, supra note 25, at 235. 
 44.  Doughtery, supra note 25, at 235. 
 45.  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
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original intellectual conceptions of the author.”46  The Court 
reasoned that originality should be found because of plaintiff’s 
level of control over the costumes, accessories and arrangement 
of the photo.47  Stated differently, the author’s creative control 
over the photograph entitled him to copyright protection.48 
The Court again touched on the originality requirement in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.,49 
explaining  that “originality” requires: (1) independent 
creation; and (2) some minimal degree of creativity.”50  The 
Court described the level of creativity required as “extremely 
low; even a slight amount will suffice.”51  The Court instructed 
courts to look for “some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, 
humble or obvious’ it might be.”52  The Court imposed a 
limitation on originality, holding that copyright protection may 
extend only to those components of a work that are original to 
the author.53  This reasoning served as the basis for holding 
that telephone white pages organized alphabetically by 
individuals’ last names were not original because the alleged 
originality was “devoid of even the slightest trace of 
creativity.”54 
As an alternative reason for striking down the alleged 
originality of the white pages, the Feist Court reasoned that 
Respondent Rural might not even have truly selected to 
publish the names and telephone numbers of its subscribers in 
the way it did.55  Instead, the Kansas Corporation Commission, 
as a condition of granting a monopoly, required Rural to 
alphabetically arrange the names.56  As a result, the Court 
 
 46.  Id. at 58. 
 47.  See id. at 60 (explaining how plaintiff created the picture “entirely from 
his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the 
said [picture subject] Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging 
the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, 
arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing 
the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression and from such 
disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by the plaintiff, he 
produced the picture in suit”) (emphasis added). 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 50.  Id. at 345. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. (quoting 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 1.08[C][1]). 
 53.  Id. at 348. 
 54.  Id. at 362. 
 55.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). 
 56.  See id. 
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recognized the possibility that Rural’s alleged creative or 
original contribution was in reality dictated by an external 
force—the Kansas Corporation Commission—not by Rural.57 
d. Authorship 
Authorship is a constitutional prerequisite to copyright 
protection.58  Title 17 of the United States Code section 101 
does not define authorship.59  However, in Burrow-Giles, the 
Supreme Court defined an author as “he to whom anything 
owes its origin; originator; maker, one who completes a work of 
science or literature.”60 
In the context of a motion picture, European countries 
utilize a bright-line statutory definition of author as “the 
principal director, the principal screenwriter, and the 
composer.”61 In the United States, questions of authorship in 
the context of motion pictures are typically avoided through 
routine application of the “work made for hire” doctrine.62 
In Aalmuhammed v. Lee,63 the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the issue of authorship in a motion picture in the context of a 
joint authorship claim.  In that case, Spike Lee entered into a 
contract with Warner Brothers to make the movie Malcolm X.64  
Lee co-wrote the screenplay, directed and co-produced the 
motion picture, which starred Denzel Washington as Malcolm 
X.65  At Mr. Washington’s request, Petitioner Jefri 
Aalmuhammed was asked to assist Washington in preparation 
for the role because Aalmuhammed knew a great deal about 
Malcolm X and Islam.66  Aalmuhammed’s involvement in the 
 
 57.  See id.  In the context of Garcia, this reasoning is critical because Garcia’s 
alleged creativity, i.e., her performance in the Film, is arguably controlled by an 
external factor: her producer.  This argument is further discussed infra at notes 
179–81. 
 58.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 59.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 for a list of pertinent Copyright Act definitions, none 
of which define authorship. 
 60.  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
 61.  Chisum, supra note 18, at 286 (citing Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 
Oct. 1993, Harmonizing the Term for Protection of Copyright and Certain Related 
Rights, Art. 2)). 
 62.  Doughtery, supra note 25, at 269.  For a discussion of copyright 
ownership under the work made for hire doctrine, see infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 63.  Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 64.  Id. at 1229. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
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motion picture was: (1) reviewing the shooting script and 
suggesting script revisions; (2) directing Denzel Washington 
and other actors while on set; (3) creating at least two entire 
scenes with new characters; (4) translating Arabic into English 
for subtitles; (5) supplying his own voice for voice-overs; (6) 
selecting proper prayers and religious practices for the 
characters; and (7) editing parts of the movie during post 
production.67 
Similar to Garcia, Aalmuhammed did not have a written 
contract with Warner Brothers, Lee, or Lee’s production 
companies.68  After cashing a $25,000 check from Lee and 
receiving $100,000 from Denzel Washington, Aalmuhammed 
asked for a writing credit as a co-writer of Malcolm X, but was 
rejected.69  Instead, Aalmuhammed was credited as an “Islamic 
Technical Consultant.”70  After receiving a Certificate of 
Registration from the United States Copyright Office,71 
Aalmuhammed filed a complaint against, among others, Spike 
Lee, his production company, and Warner Brothers seeking, 
among other relief, declaratory relief and accounting under the 
Copyright Act.72  After dismissal of his claims, Aalmuhammed 
appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
The Ninth Circuit articulated various interpretations of 
“author.”  First, the court described an author as “the 
originator or the person who causes something to come into 
being.”73  The court also described an author as one who 
“superintends” the work by exercising control.74  Lastly, the 
court described author as “ ‘ the inventive or master mind’ who 
‘creates or gives effect to the idea.’ ” 75  The court reasoned that 
 
 67.  Id. at 1229–30. 
 68.  Id. at 1230.  The fact that no contract existed between Warner Brothers 
and Aalmuhammed demonstrates that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s belief in 
Garcia, studios do not always contract with the various individuals involved in 
production.  See infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (suggesting that 
Garcia is a limited decision because Garcia-issues are often avoided through work 
made for hire agreements). 
 69.  Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 1230. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 1232. 
 74.  Id. at 1234 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 
53, 58 (1884)). 
 75.  Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 
61)(citation omitted). 
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authorship required more than minimal creative or original 
contribution to a work.76 
The Ninth Circuit held that Aalmuhammed was not an 
author because: (1) Aalmuhammed did not superintend the 
work; (2) Aalmuhammed was not the person who actually 
formed the picture by putting the persons in position or 
arranging the place;(3) Aalmuhammed could not have 
benefited from the work unless the director chose to accept his 
recommendations; and (4) valuable contribution is not enough 
for co-authorship.77 
Although Aalmuhammed may be limited to the context of 
joint authorship claims, the dissent in Garcia argues that 
Aalmuhammed articulated “general principles” of authorship 
that should be considered when analyzing Garcia’s authorship 
claim.78 
B. Copyright Ownership 
This section will address general copyright ownership 
principals, followed by joint ownership principles, namely the 
work made for hire doctrine and joint works of authorship. 
1. General Rights of the Copyright Holder 
Copyright protection enables an author to prevent others 
from reproducing his individual expression without his 
consent.79  However, copyright does not preclude others from 
using the ideas or information revealed by the author’s work.80  
Moreover, copyright only prevents others from copying the 
author’s particular method of expressing ideas or facts, 
providing no rights in the underlying ideas or facts.81  Under 
the current copyright system, federal copyright arises 
automatically, as a matter of law, as soon as a qualifying work 
of authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.82 
 
 76.  Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58). 
 77.  Id. at 1235. 
 78.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, N.R., 
dissenting) (arguing that Aalmuhammed pulled authorship principles from the 
Supreme Court case Burrow-Giles Litographic Co. v. Sarony, which had nothing 
to do with joint works). 
 79.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 403. 
 80.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 402. For example, independent creation is not 
an infringement of copyright. 
 81.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 409. 
 82.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 408–09. 
4_FERRARI FINAL 3/25/2016  10:59 PM 
386 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Some European countries have characterized copyright as 
a personal right of the author, or as a combination of personal 
and property rights.83  On the theory of personal rights, 
countries have included in their copyright laws a “moral 
rights” provision.84  These provisions seek to protect the author 
against certain acts injurious to his or her personal identity or 
reputation.85  These rights include, among other rights, 
preventing the reproduction of the author’s work in a distorted 
or degrading form.86  The United States has never recognized 
such moral rights of authors.87 
United States Copyright law imposes certain limitations 
and conditions on copyright protection: 
(1) The rights of the copyright owner do not extend to 
certain uses of the work; 
(2) The term of copyright is limited, as required by the 
Constitution; 
(3) A notice of copyright in published works is required; 
(4) The registration of copyrights and the recordation of 
transfers of ownership are required.88 
These limitations often juxtapose against the interest of 
allowing an author to receive the widest potential 
dissemination of his or her work.89  Thus, the above limitations 
seek to not become so burdensome as to restrict or deprive 
authors of their justified reward.90 
2. Joint Ownership 
Title 17 of the United States Code section 201(a) states 
that copyright “vests initially in the author or authors of the 
work.”91  However, where more than one person participates in 
a work’s creation, the work may be classified as, among other 
classifications, a work made for hire or a joint work.92 
 
 83.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 403. 
 84.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 403. 
 85.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 403. 
 86.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 403. 
 87.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 403. 
 88.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 405. 
 89.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 405. 
 90.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 405. 
 91.  17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
 92.  Barrett, supra note 20, at 658. 
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a. Work Made for Hire 
Title 17 of the United States Code section 201(b) states 
“the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared 
is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless 
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written 
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in 
the copyright.”93  “Work made for hire” is statutorily defined 
pursuant to two scenarios: 
(1) a work is prepared by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment (“Scenario 1”); or 
(2) a work is specially ordered or commissioned for use as a 
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work . . . if the parties 
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them 
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire 
(“Scenario 2”).94 
As recognized by the Supreme Court, the work made for 
hire doctrine carries “profound significance for freelance 
creators - including artists, writers, photographers, designers, 
composers . . . and for the publishing, advertising, music, and 
other industries which commission their work.”95 
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,96 the 
Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) retained 
Respondent James Earl Reid to produce a sculpture.97  The 
parties agreed that the project would cost no more than 
$15,000, not including Reid’s services, which he offered to 
donate.98  The parties did not sign a written agreement or 
mention copyright.99  The Court held that Congress, “in using 
the term ‘employee’ . . . meant to refer to a hired party in a 
conventional employment relationship.”100  As a result, the 
 
 93.  17 U.S.C. § 201(b).  Here, there is no evidence of a written instrument 
between Youssef and Garcia, triggering the work made for hire doctrine. 
 94.  Here, Scenario 1 is relevant because there is no evidence of a written 
instrument between Youssef and Garcia, voiding Scenario 2. 
 95.  Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 733. 
 98.  Id. at 734. 
 99.  Id. at 734.  Without a written contract, “Scenario 2” of the work made for 
hire doctrine, see supra at note 94, is voided. CCNV thus argued work made for 
hire under Scenario 1, i.e., that Reid was an employee of CCNV acting within the 
scope of his employment. 
 100.  Id. at 743. 
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Court, applying Restatement (Second) of Agency principals of 
agency, applied the following factors in considering whether 
Reid was an “employee” for the purpose of the “work for hire” 
doctrine: 
[1] the skill required; [2] the source of the instrumentalities 
and tools; [3] the location of the work; [4] the duration of 
the relationship between the parties; [5] whether the hiring 
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired 
party; [6] the extent of the hired party’s discretion over 
when and how long to work; [7] the method of payment; [8] 
the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; [9] 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the 
hiring party; [10] whether the hiring party is in business; 
[11] the provision of employee benefits; and [12] the tax 
treatment of the hired party.101 
The Court held that Reid was not an employee of CCNV 
but was instead an independent contractor.102  Because Reid 
was an independent contractor without a signed agreement, 
the sculpture did not qualify as a work made for hire.103  In 
practice, courts have treated the financial relationship 
between the parties, including payroll formalities and tax 
treatment, as highly probative.104 
b. Joint Works 
Under Title 17 of the United States Code section 101, a 
“joint work” is defined as “a work prepared by two or more 
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged 
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”105  
The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the 
work and are treated as tenants in common, with each co-
owner having an independent right to use or license the use of 
 
 101.  Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52.  The 
Court also stated that no one factor is determinative. 
 102.  Id. at 753 (1989). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Chisum, supra note 18, at 323 (citing Kirk v. Harter, 188 F.3d 1005 (8th 
Cir. 1999); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); Aymes v. 
Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992) (reasoning that “every case since Reid . . . has 
found the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring party 
failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.”); But see JustMed Inc., v. 
Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a programmer was an employee 
despite the fact that he worked at home, was not paid benefits, and did not have 
taxes withheld). 
 105.  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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a work.106  Because of this relationship, the Ninth Circuit has 
held that “a joint author cannot be held liable for copyright 
infringement against another joint owner.”107  Moreover, where 
one person makes a relatively small contribution to a work 
predominately created by another, courts are reluctant to find 
joint authorship.108  In addition, courts have added two 
statutory requirements to the joint work criterion: (1) each 
author must contribute copyrightable expression to the final 
work, and (2) the parties must intend themselves to be joint 
authors.109 
C. Background of Garcia 
On July 2, 2012, a fourteen-minute trailer entitled 
Innocence of Muslims110 (“the Film”) was uploaded to 
YouTube.111  Subsequent to the upload, the Film was 
translated to Arabic and uploaded several more times in the 
weeks leading up to the thirteenth anniversary of the 
September 11th terrorism attacks.112  The Film gained 
worldwide recognition and became the object of hostile 
attention in many countries.113  The Film was also allegedly 
tied to the September 11, 2012 ambushing of the U.S. Embassy 
in Benghazi, which resulted in the deaths of three Americans 
and the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens.114 
 
 106.  Chisum, supra note 18, at 325 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476). 
 107.  Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632–33 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Richmond v. 
Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 46 (9th Cir. 1965)); Picture Music, Inc., v. Bourne, Inc., 314 
F. Supp. 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 108.  See, e.g., Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 704 (N.D. Ill. 
1986). 
 109.  Chisum, supra note 18, at 328. 
 110.  The Film was also uploaded under titles “Muhammad Movie” and “The 
Real Life of Muhammad.”  See Zachary Zahos, The Art of Defamation, THE 
CORNELL DAILY SUN, (October 4, 2014), http://cornellsun.com/blog/2012/09/19
/the-art-of-defamation/. 
 111.  First Amended Complaint at 2, Cindy Lee Garcia v. Nakoula Basseley 
Nakoula, et al., No. 12-8315 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2012) (hereinafter “F.A. Compl.”). 
 112.  Ian Lovett, Man Linked to Film in Protests is Questioned, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, (September 15, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/world/
middleeast/man-linked-to-film-in-protests-is-questioned.html?_r=0. 
 113.  See F.A. Compl. at 2.  See also Rick Gladstone, Anti-American Protests 
Flare Beyond the Mideast, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (September 14, 2012) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/world/middleeast/anti-american-protests-
over-film-enter-4th-day.html?pagewanted=all. 
 114.  Margaret Coker, et al., Libya Attack Sparks Crisis, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, (September 13, 2012) http://on.wsj.com/OG7HV0.  However, former 
CIA director David Petraeus later told Congress that the events in Benghazi had 
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In July 2011, Garcia responded to a casting call posted by 
Defendant Nakoula Basseley Nakoula (“Youssef”)115 for the 
Film.116  The producer of the Film described it as “an 
‘adventure’ story set in the Arabian Desert 2,000 years ago.”117  
Garcia concedes her role in the Film was merely “an 
actress.”118  Garcia was “given only specific pages” of the script 
and had no involvement in writing, directing, filming, editing, 
or producing the Film.119  Youssef held himself out to be “the 
writer and producer” of the Film and Garcia conceded that 
Youssef “managed all aspects of the production.”120 
The line that Garcia provided during production was: 
Is George crazy? Our daughter is but a child?121 
However, the version of the Film that was ultimately 
broadcasted on YouTube retained Garcia’s visual appearance, 
but dubbed in the words: 
Is your Mohammed a child molester?122 
As a result of those words, Egyptian cleric Ahmad Fouad 
Ashoush issued a fatwa directed at Garcia and every other 
person appearing in the Film.123  Soon thereafter, Garcia 
became the subject of numerous death threats.124   
Garcia filed eight takedown notices with YouTube.125  
YouTube did not remove or disable the content and instead 
denied Garcia’s requests.126 
On September 19, 2012 Garcia filed a lawsuit against, 
 
nothing to do with the Film.  Ben Shapiro, THE PEOPLE VS. BARACK OBAMA, 55 
(Threshold Editions 2014). 
 115.  Mr. Nakoula has many aliases, but will be referred to in this Comment 
as “Youssef.” 
 116.  F.A. Compl. at 7. 
 117.  Brief of Appellant Cindy Lee Garcia at 16, Cindy Lee Garcia v. Google 
Inc., et al., No. 12-57302  (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013) (hereinafter “Garcia Opening 
Br.”). 
 118.  Appellees Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC’s Answering Brief at 10, Cindy 
Lee Garcia v. Google Inc., et al., No. 12-57302 (9th Circuit Feb. 15, 2013) 
(hereinafter “Google/YouTube Answering Br.”). 
 119.  Google/YouTube Answering Br. at 10. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Garcia Opening Br. at 17. 
 122.  Id. at 18. 
 123.  Id. at 19 (“I issue a fatwa and call on the Muslim youth in America and 
Europe to do this duty, which is to kill the director, the producer and the actors 
and everyone who helped and promoted the film.”). 
 124.  Id. at 20. 
 125.  Id. at 22. 
 126.  Id. at 23. 
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among others, Youssef, Google and YouTube in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California.127  
Garcia’s First Amended Complaint alleged the following 
causes of action: (1) Direct Infringement of Copyright; (2) 
Secondary Infringement of Copyright; (3) Fraud; (4) Unfair 
Business Practices; (5) Libel; and (6) Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress.128  On October 17, 2012, Garcia filed an Ex 
Parte Application for Preliminary Injunction, which the court 
treated as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction.129  On 
November 30, 2012, Garcia’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction was denied.130  Garcia subsequently appealed. 
D. Holding of the Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Garcia was 
“likely to succeed on her copyright claim.”131  The Ninth Circuit 
broke its copyright analysis into three issues: (1) an 
independent copyright interest; (2) work made for hire; and (3) 
implied license.132 
1. Independent Copyright Interest 
First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Garcia did not 
qualify as a joint author because Garcia expressly disclaimed 
the intent required to be deemed a joint author.133  However, 
the court reasoned that disqualification as a joint author of an 
entire work had no bearing on a copyright claim over a creative 
contribution to said work.134  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
copyright could still be recognized for creative contribution to 
a work because an actor “live[s] his part inwardly, and then . . . 
 
 127.  Compl. For (1) Direct Infringement of Copyright, (2) Secondary 
Infringement of Copyright, (3) Fraud, (4) Unfair Business Practices, (5) Libel, (6) 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Cindy Lee Garcia v. Google Inc., et 
al., No. 2-12-cv-08315  (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012).  Garcia subsequently filed a 
First Amended Complaint on October 4, 2012. 
 128.  F.A. Compl. at 9–18. 
 129.  Google/YouTube Answering Br. at 7. 
 130.  Id. at 9. 
 131.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 132.  See id. at 933–39. 
 133.  Id. at 933 (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231–36 (9th Cir. 
2000)).  Moreover, it is likely Garcia sought to avoid a declaration of joint 
authorship because such a determination would bar her copyright infringement 
cause of action against Youssef.  See supra text accompanying note 107. 
 134.  See Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). 
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gives to his experience an external embodiment.”135  This 
“external embodiment” includes “body language, facial 
expression and reactions to other actors and elements of a 
scene.”136  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that Garcia “may have” 
a copyright interest in the Film.137 
However, the Ninth Circuit limited Garcia’s copyright 
interest to “her own contribution” but not in “preexisting 
material” such as the words or actions dictated in the script.”138  
In other words, Garcia could assert a copyright interest only in 
the portion of the Film that represented her individual 
creativity.139 
2. Work Made For Hire 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed Google and YouTube’s claim 
that Garcia was an employee of Youssef.140  The court found no 
evidence that Youssef directed the Film or “controlled the 
manner” in which Garcia’s scene was shot.141  The court 
claimed that Youssef only wrote the script.142  In applying the 
factors set forth in CCNV143 to determine whether Garcia was 
an employee or an independent contractor, the court concluded 
that Garcia was not an employee of Youssef’s because Youssef 
was not in the regular business of making films.144 
3. Implied License 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Google that Garcia granted 
 
 135.  Id. at 933–34. 
 136.  Id. at 934. 
 137.  Id. at 948. 
 138.  Id. at 935.  This determination is consistent with the copyright limitation 
articulated in Feist, supra note 53. 
 139.  Id. (recognizing that “even if [Garcia’s] contribution is relatively minor, 
it isn’t de minimus.”). 
 140.  See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2014).  In 
essence, Google/YouTube attempted to trigger “Scenario 2,” see supra note 94, 
under the work for hire doctrine, arguing that Garcia performed her scene as an 
employee within the scope of her employment. 
 141.  Garcia, 766 F.3d at 936. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See supra text accompanying note 101 for a restatement of the twelve 
CCNV factors. 
 144.  Garcia, 766 F.3d at 936–37 (reasoning that Youssef was not in the 
regular business of making films because he did not have union contracts, 
relationships with prop houses or other film suppliers, leases of studio space, or 
distribution agreements). 
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Youssef an implied license to use her performance.145  
However, the Ninth Circuit held that Youssef exceeded the 
bounds of Garcia’s implied license.146  The court hinged upon 
the fact that Youssef lied to Garcia in order to secure her 
participation and that she agreed to perform in reliance on that 
lie.147  This fraud alone voided any implied license Garcia 
granted to Youssef.148 
E. Subsequent Rehearing En Banc 
On March 12, 2014 Google and YouTube filed a Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc.149  Google argued that “[t]he majority’s 
opinion triggered deep concern in the entertainment and video 
industries - industries centered within [the Ninth] circuit.  The 
majority’s decision empowers even minor players in films to 
wave around the threat of an injunction to shut down 
distribution.”150 
On November 12, 2014, the Ninth Circuit granted the 
Petition for Rehearing En Banc of Google and YouTube.151  On 
December 15, 2014, counsel for Garcia and Google/YouTube 
presented oral arguments.152  In its en banc opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the decision of the original three-judge panel 
of the Ninth Circuit.153  The en banc opinion ultimately showed 
strong deference to the Copyright Office, whom rejected 
 
 145.  Id. at 937. 
 146.  See id. 
 147.  See id.  Youssef lied to Garcia by telling her the Film was an adventure 
story set in the Arabian Desert.  In reality, the Film was a reprehensible political 
propaganda piece. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Petition for Rehearing En Banc By Google and YouTube, Cindy Lee 
Garcia v. Google Inc., et al., No. 12-57302 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2014). 
 150.  See Kurt Orzeck, Google Wins 9th Cir. En Banc Rehearing In ‘Muslims’ 
Row, LAW360 (November 12, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/595474
/google -wins-9th-circ-en-banc-rehearing-in-muslims-row. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  See Brandon Lowry, Google Tells En Banc 9th Cir. Video Ruling May 
Fracture IP, LAW360 (December 15, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/
604939/google-tells-en-banc-9th-circ-video-ruling-may-fracture-ip.  Some have 
called the en banc decision “one of the most, if not the most, important intellectual 
property decisions of 2014.”  Stephen Wiman, On December 15, 2014, The Ninth 
Circuit En Banc Will Hear Garcia v. Google, Inc./Actors And Producers Await 
The Result,  JDSUPRA BUSINESS ADVISOR (December 4, 2014), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/on-december-15-2014-the-ninth-circuit -
72575/. 
 153.  Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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Garcia’s copyright application.154 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL ISSUE  
An insignificant supporting actor/actress who had no 
control over his or her performance or the motion picture as a 
whole should not be found to be an author for purposes of 
copyright.  However, the Garcia opinion, prior to its reversal, 
arguably extended authorship to anyone who creatively 
contributed to a motion picture.  Moreover, the Garcia opinion 
conflicts with Feist, specifically the inquiry regarding whether 
an individual has discretion over his or her alleged creative 
contribution.155 
Garcia is of interest not only to the legal community 
because it muddles United States copyright law, but also to 
Hollywood and the business community because it impacts 
movie studios and companies that engage in content 
streaming.156  The remainder of this Comment will analyze the 
original Garcia opinion, i.e., prior to the en banc reversal, 
identify and discuss its far-reaching implications, and propose 
a solution to those issues.  Although the Ninth Circuit’s en banc 
opinion later reached the correct conclusion in denying 
Garcia’s copyright claim, this Comment serves to discuss and 
outline the dangers of accepting a copyright claim similar to 
Garcia’s, should another “Garcia” claim arise.157  Moreover, the 
Ninth Circuit only reached the correct conclusion after 
undergoing an en banc proceeding, which implies that there is 
continued disagreement within the court over whether Garcia 
should be granted copyright authorship.  Although the Garcia 
opinion at focus in this Comment is now moot, this Comment 
 
 154.  Id. at 741. 
 155.  See supra notes 55–57. 
 156.  Netflix, for example, is a subscription service that provides members 
with access to motion pictures, television, and other audio-visual entertainment.  
See NETFLIX TERMS OF USE, https://www.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2016).  Netflix is required to obtain the consent of any author of a motion 
picture or television series prior to allowing access to said motion picture or 
television series.  Id.  Thus, under Garcia, Netflix would be required to obtain the 
consent of any individual who creatively contributed to the motion picture or 
television series, including cameramen, makeup artists, and supporting actors or 
actresses.  This is not only impractical, discussed infra at Part III.C, but forces 
Netflix to engage in speculative analyses regarding whether an individual is an 
author under Garcia. 
 157.  Garcia claims have been filed in other circuits.  See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, 
LLC v. Merkin, No. 13-3865, 2015 WL 3937947 (2d Cir. June 29, 2015). 
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may aid other courts seeking to reject claims similar to Garcia 
and presents a novel test that allows courts to strike a balance 
in the face of future Garcia claims. 
III. ANALYSIS 
This analysis will first discuss whether Garcia has a 
copyright interest by examining the following four issues: (1) 
whether Aalmuhammed should have been afforded more 
consideration and, under Aalmuhammed, whether Garcia is 
the “master mind” of the Film;158 (2) whether a high degree of 
“control” should be required to classify an actor/actress as an 
author;159 (3) whether the exclusive rights of an author are 
weakened under Garcia;160 and (4) whether the cases relied 
upon by Garcia are distinguishable.161  The analysis of whether 
Garcia has a copyright interest will conclude by addressing 
whether, as the Ninth Circuit believed, Garcia is a limited 
opinion and whether judicial efficiency is best served under 
Garcia.162 
Next, this analysis will re-examine the Garcia court’s work 
for hire analysis, specifically arguing that the court arbitrarily 
relied on one factor.163  Finally, this Comment will examine the 
broader implications of Garcia for companies that engage in 
content streaming.164 
A. Garcia’s Copyright Interest 
1. Aalmuhammed deserves more consideration than 
the Ninth Circuit afforded  it.  Under 
Aalmuhammed, Garcia is not the “master mind” of 
the Film. 
The Ninth Circuit should have afforded Aalmuhammed 
more weight because although that case was decided in the 
context of joint authorship, it articulated “general principles” 
of authorship that are applicable to Garcia’s interest in her 
 
 158.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 159.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 160.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 161.  See infra Part II.A.4. 
 162.  See infra Part II.A.5. 
 163.  See infra Part II.B. 
 164.  See infra Part II.C. 
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performance.165  Moreover, Aalmuhammed heightens the 
requirements of authorship, which is justified considering an 
author of a motion picture can dictate the distribution of said 
motion picture.  As reprehensible as the Film was, Garcia 
should have faced a heightened requirement for authorship 
considering she attempted to dictate the distribution of the 
Film by petitioning for its removal from YouTube.  Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit erred in failing to align Aalmuhammed with 
Garcia. 
Aalmuhammed defined an author as, among other 
definitions, “the person to whom the work owes its origin and 
who superintended the whole work, the ‘master mind.’ ” 166  The 
Aalmuhammed court limited authorship to “someone at the top 
of the screen credits, sometimes the producer, sometimes the 
director, possibly the star, or the screenwriter - someone who 
has artistic control.”167  Lastly, the Aalmuhammed court noted 
that an author should “superintend” the work by, for example, 
arranging the positioning of the people in the film.168 
Under Aalmuhammed, Garcia is not the “master mind”169 
of the Film.  Garcia appeared in the Film for no more than five 
seconds.170  She did not produce the Film, did not direct the 
Film, nor write the Film’s script.171  These facts alone are 
enough to conclude that Garcia is not the master mind of the 
Film because Garcia is not exercising any artistic control or 
superintending the Film. 
However, Garcia concedes additional facts that support a 
finding that Youssef, not Garcia, is the master mind of the 
Film.  Garcia concedes that Youssef was “the writer and 
producer” of the Film.172 Garcia also concedes that Youssef 
“managed all aspects of production.”173 Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
 
 165.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, N.R., 
dissenting); See also supra note 78.  The dissent also argued that Garcia’s interest 
in her acting performance could be analyzed as a joint work with Youssef, 
considering she relied on Youssef’s script, equipment, and direction.  See Garcia, 
766 F.3d at 942 n.3.  Thus, Aalmuhammed is applicable. 
 166.  Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233 (citation omitted). 
 167.  Id. at 1233 (emphasis added). 
 168.  Id. at 1234. 
 169.  Id. at 1233 (citation omitted). 
 170.  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737. 
 171.  F.A. Compl. at 5. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
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should have held that Youssef, not Garcia, was the master 
mind of the Film. 
2. A high degree of “control” should be required to 
hold an actor or actress as an author. 
The concept of control was discussed in Lindsay v. The 
Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic.174  In that case, 
plaintiff argued that she had a copyright interest in a film 
because she closely supervised the filming of the motion 
picture.175  The court found that the plaintiff had a copyright 
interest, but made clear the extent of control necessary to be 
deemed an author of a motion picture: 
All else being equal, where a plaintiff alleges that he 
exercised such a high degree of control over a film operation 
- including the type and amount of lighting used, the 
specific camera angles to be employed, and other detail-
intensive artistic elements of a film - such that the final 
product duplicates his concepts and visions of what the film 
should look like.176 
Here, Youssef controlled all aspects of the Film’s 
production.177  Youssef’s control extended beyond the Film 
itself, but also to Garcia’s performance in the film by virtue of 
his control over production and scripting.  This alone 
establishes that Youssef controlled Garcia’s performance and 
is thus the author of her performance.178 
Moreover, Garcia’s control over her performance should be 
considered in context of Feist, which recognized that Rural 
might not have even selected to publish the names and 
telephone numbers of its subscribers in the way it did.179  The 
Feist Court classified Rural’s control over its creative 
 
 174.  Lindsay v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15837 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1999). 
 175.  Id. at 4–7. 
 176.  Lindsay, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15837, at 15. 
 177.  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 744. 
 178.  See Doughtery, supra note 25, at 244–45 (“When one individual directs 
and controls the expression of another, the general copyright principals . . . 
suggest that the person who directs or controls the origination of expression is 
the author of that expression.”). 
 179.  See supra notes 55–57.  Put simply, the argument was that the Kansas 
Corporation Commission—not Rural—was the source of Rural’s alleged creative 
contribution. 
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contribution as the product of an external force.180  The same 
is true here.  Garcia’s external force is Youssef, who is 
controlling all aspects of production and scripting of the 
Film.181  Thus, Garcia’s performance is “devoid of even the 
slightest trace of creativity”182 given that Youssef dictated the 
production and scripting of Garcia’s scene. 
The Ninth Circuit muddled United States copyright law 
by holding that any time an actor contributes to a film with a 
small performance that meets a minimal amount of creativity, 
the performance is copyrightable and the performer can control 
the distribution of said film.183 However, a performer’s work is 
arguably not considered original, and thus not copyrightable, 
to the extent that the actor’s performance is not within his or 
her control, i.e., the material is described in the screenplay, is 
originated by the director, is dictated by necessity, consists of 
standard, stock movements, or is copied from other 
performances.184  Moreover, an actor’s “general style” would 
not be copyrightable since it is merely an idea, which is not 
copyrightable subject matter.185  As a result, a higher degree of 
artistic control should have been required in Garcia, a burden 
Garcia would be unable to meet.186 
 
 
 
 
 180.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). 
 181.  F.A. Compl. at 5. 
 182.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 362. 
 183.  See generally Br. of Amici Curiae Professors of Intellectual Property Law 
In Support of Google, Inc. and YouTube, LLC’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 
Cindy Lee Garcia v. Google Inc., et al., (9th Circuit No. 12-57302, April 14, 2014) 
(hereinafter “Br. of Amici Curiae Professors”). 
 184.  Doughtery, supra note 25, at 304. 
 185.  See supra note 39.  See also Doughtery, supra note 25, at 304; Feist, 499 
U.S. at 345, supra notes 49–50 (holding that “independent creation” is a 
requirement for originality).  Here, an actor’s performance should not be found to 
be an “independent creation” if a script or producer is controlling the performance 
of said actor/actress. 
 186.  See 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright at 2-
69 (2000) (reasoning that the legislative history’s statement that copyright would 
not be extended to “social dance steps and simple routines,” H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, at 54 (1976), may suggest a heightened creativity requirement).  See also 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, supra notes 45–48, (recognizing that a 
high level of creative control entitled an author of a photograph to copyright).  See 
infra Part IV.A for a discussion of a proposed solution to Garcia claims that 
analyze the actor’s level of discretion in performing his or her role. 
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3. Under Garcia, the exclusive right of a film’s true 
author is weaker and  potentially in conflict with 
hundreds of individuals involved in the making of 
said film. 
Extending copyright to each contributor of a film renders 
the true author’s exclusive rights afforded to him or her 
meaningless.187 An author could “not possibly exercise the 
exclusive rights afford under the Copyright Act without 
trampling on the rights of other contributors.”188  Accordingly, 
the true copyright owner would face undue restraints on his 
ability to market his work because the owner would have to 
gain permission from each and every performer who may have 
rights in the underlying work before he could safely distribute 
it.189 
4. The crutch of cases leaned on by Garcia are 
misplaced and distinguishable. 
Garcia relies on Fleet v. CBS190 to support the proposition 
that an actor’s performance in a film is independently 
copyrightable.191  However, Fleet analyzed a different issue.  In 
Fleet, the court considered whether the Copyright Act 
preempts a cause of action for misappropriation.192 The Fleet 
court merely held that the actors’ misappropriation claims 
were preempted because the images of the actors were taken 
directly from a copyrighted motion picture.193  That holding has 
absolutely no bearing on the crux of Garcia’s claim because 
merely finding something is within the scope of United States 
Copyright law does not deem it protected by United States 
 
 187.  See Booth v. Colegate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973). 
 188.  Opposition of Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC to Plaintiff’s Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction and Order of Impoundment at 15, Cindy Lee Garcia v. 
Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, et al., (N.D. Cal. No. 12-8315, October 29, 2012) 
(hereinafter “Opp’n of Google/YouTube to Garcia’s Prelim. Inj.”). 
 189.  Opp’n of Google/YouTube to Garcia’s Prelim. Inj. at 15.  In other words, 
Garcia conflicts with Congress’ intent by burdening an author’s copyright reward.  
See supra note 90. 
 190.  Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1911, 1919–20 (1996). 
 191.  Garcia Opening Br. at 31. 
 192.  Google/YouTube Answering Br. at 10.  This issue differs from Garcia 
because the actors in Fleet did not state a claim for copyright infringement as 
Garcia did.  See supra note 127 for the causes of action Garcia filed against 
Youssef, Google, and YouTube. 
 193.  See Fleet, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1924. 
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Copyright law.194  Stated differently, “the shadow actually cast 
by the [Copyright] Act’s preemption is notably broader than 
the wing of its protection.”195 
Garcia also relies on Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 
Canada, Inc.,196 for the proposition that a performer retains 
the copyright in her performance unless she transfers or 
assigns the right to another.197  However, Jules Jordan Video 
is distinguishable because, in that case, the actor also 
produced, directed, wrote the script, and filmed the movie in 
which he claimed a copyright interest.198  By Garcia’s own 
assertions, the Film was produced, directed, and controlled in 
all respects by Youssef, not Garcia, which brings Garcia 
outside of the scope of Jules Jordan Video.199 
5. Garcia is not narrowly tailored and stands in the 
face of judicial efficiency. 
The Ninth Circuit argued that its opinion is limited to 
Garcia because “the vast majority of films are covered by 
contract, the work for hire doctrine, or implied licenses.”200  
However, it is a stretch to assume that Hollywood studios—
while they may enter into contracts over intellectual property 
rights with star actors—enter into copyright contracts with 
non-leads like Garcia, much less with makeup artists, set 
designers, and the variety of other contributors who may assert 
litigable copyright claims under Garcia.201  In fact, Warner 
Brothers—one of the most sophisticated and respected studios 
in the world—did not enter into a contract with 
 
 194.  See Shelby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d. 1053, 1058 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000) (explaining that “scope and protection are not synonymous”). 
 195.  U.S. ex rel. v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th 
Cir. 1997). 
 196.  Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 197.  Opp’n of Google/YouTube to Garcia’s Prelim. Inj. at 16. 
 198.  Id. (citing Jules Jordan Video, Inc., 617 F.3d at 1150.) The Jules court 
explained Plaintiff’s contribution as a “one-man shop.” Id. 
 199.  Opp’n of Google/YouTube to Garcia’s Prelim. Inj. at 16. 
 200.  See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 936 (citing Doughtery, supra 
note 25, at 238, 317–18, 327–33).  Even the en banc panel argued that “[t]he 
reality is that contracts and the work-made-for-hire doctrine govern much of the 
big budget Hollywood performance and production world.”  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 
743 (citing 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07(b)(2)). 
 201.  Br. of Amici Curiae Professors at 9. 
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Aalmuhammed,202 showing that studios do not always enter 
into contracts with every person involved in production.  
Although producers would ordinarily engage actors under 
work for hire agreements, such agreements do not always 
exist.203  More importantly, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion will not 
be confined to Hollywood studios: it applies to everyone who 
captures others on film, from professionals to amateurs to 
technology companies and media outlets.204  Thus, judicial 
efficiency should be considered.  Garcia does not provide 
judicial efficiency because it allows anyone involved in a film 
to claim a copyright interest, leading to a potential influx in 
litigation and an uncertain standard for businesses to apply to 
decision-making. 
Lastly, multiple circuits agree on one principal: 
broadening copyright authorship risks extending copyright 
claims to overreaching contributors and denying sole authors 
exclusive authorship status simply because another person 
rendered some form of assistance.205  Garcia brings those risks 
to life by standing for the proposition that virtually any 
sequence of actions captured on film will constitute a 
copyrighted performance owned separately from the copyright 
in the film.206 
The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Garcia may have 
a copyrightable interest for the following reasons: (1) 
Aalmuhammed should have been afforded more consideration 
and, under Aalmuhammed, Garcia is not the “master mind”; 
(2) a high degree of artistic control should be required to 
classify an actor/actress as an author, and Garcia does not 
demonstrate a high degree of control over her performance in 
the Film; (3) the exclusive rights of an author are weakened 
under Garcia; (4) the cases relied upon by Garcia are 
distinguishable; and (5) Garcia is not narrowly tailored and 
does not provide judicial efficiency. 
 
 202.  See supra note 68. 
 203.  Doughtery, supra note 25, at 306. 
 204.  Br. of Amici Curiae Professors at 9.  For a further discussion on the 
effects of Garcia on technology companies, see infra Part III.C. 
 205.  See Google/YouTube Answering Br. at 16–17.  See also Childress v. 
Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 1991); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 648 
(7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “copyright would explode” if every contributor to 
a collaborative work was afford authorship status). 
 206.  Br. of Amici Curiae Professors at 9. 
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B. Work For Hire Analysis 
The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Garcia was not an 
employee of Youssef.  The court reached this decision solely 
based on the fact that Youssef was not in the “regular business” 
of making films.207  The Ninth Circuit arbitrarily relied on one 
of twelve factors, despite the express instruction by the CCNV 
Court to not weigh any one factor as dispositive.208 
Here, Garcia’s complaint is littered with facts that suggest 
she is an employee.  For example, Garcia admits she was hired 
as an actress for a role in the Film;209 Garcia was paid $500 for 
her work;210 and Garcia concedes that Youssef “managed all 
aspects of production.”211  Moreover, Youssef provided the 
instrumentalities and tools, dictated the filming location, 
decided when and how long Garcia worked, and was engaged 
in the business of film making at the time.212  Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit erred by arbitrarily relying on one factor—whether—
the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party—of 
the twelve discussed in CCNV and ignored pertinent facts 
related to those other factors.  
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit feared that classifying 
Garcia as an employee of Youssef would transform “every 
schmuck with a video camera [into] a movie mogul.”213  
However, the sole factor relied upon in Garcia—whether the 
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party—should 
not be weighed heavily in this context.  When an individual 
takes a photo of the Golden Gate Bridge, he is entitled to 
copyright over that photo.  When an individual composes a 
song, he is entitled to copyright over that song.  Whether 
photography or music is a hobby or a career has no bearing on 
whether copyright is granted because copyright is an 
automatic right that arises once an original work of authorship 
is fixed to a tangible medium of expression.214  Thus, whether 
 
 207.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 936.  In CCNV, the Supreme Court 
expressly stated that no one factor should be treated as dispositive.  See supra 
text accompanying note 101. 
 208.  See supra text accompanying note 101 for a restatement of the twelve 
CCNV factors. 
 209.  F.A. Compl. at 4, 27. 
 210.  Garcia, 766 F.3d at 948. 
 211.  F.A. Compl. at 5. 
 212.  Garcia, 766 F.3d at 946 (Smith, N.R., dissenting). 
 213.  Id. at 934. 
 214.  See supra note 82. 
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Youssef was an industry mogul or a “schmuck with a 
camera”215 should not have been treated as a dispositive fact—
and it was—in the court’s work for hire analysis.  The Ninth 
Circuit therefore erred in its work for hire analysis. 
C. Beyond the Courtroom: Effects of Garcia on Technology 
Companies 
The Garcia court, prior to its en banc reversal, ordered 
Google and YouTube to take down all copies of the Film from 
YouTube and any other platforms within its control and to take 
all reasonable steps to prevent further uploads.216  Various 
technology companies filed a joint Amici Curiae brief in 
support of Google and YouTube which brought to light several 
impracticalities of the Garcia opinion.217 
The Technology Companies argued that the Ninth 
Circuit’s injunction was impracticable for the following 
reasons: 
(1) An online service cannot guarantee compliance with an 
order preventing all new appearances of material.  Any 
combination of technological efforts and (at great expense) 
manual efforts would surely fall short. 
(2) Many online services, in particular smaller or newer 
competitors, lack resources, technology, staffing, or the 
appropriate architecture to attempt even partial 
compliance. 
(3) The added threat of contempt sanctions would compel 
services to suppress lawful materials or withdraw their 
services, and the effect would be either censorship of 
legitimate speech or a loss of competition and choice in the 
online marketplace.218 
The Ninth Circuit’s injunction was also worrisome because 
 
 215.  Garcia, 766 F.3d at 934. 
 216.  Id. at 1269 n.9. 
 217.  These companies included: Adobe Systems Inc.; Automatic Inc.; EBay 
Inc.; Facebook Inc.; Gawker Media, LLC, IAC/Interactive Corp; Kickstarter Inc.; 
Pinterest Inc.; Tumblr Inc.; Twitter, Inc.; and Yahoo! Inc (hereinafter “The 
Technology Companies”). 
 218.  Brief of Adobe Systems Inc.; Automatic Inc.; EBay Inc.; Facebook Inc.; 
Gawker Media, LLC, IAC/Interactive Corp; Kickstarter Inc.; Pinterest Inc.; 
Tumblr Inc.; Twitter, Inc.; and Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae In Support of Google 
and YouTube’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Cindy Lee Garcia v. Nakoula 
Basseley Nakoula, et al., (9th Circuit No. 12-57302, April 14, 2014) (hereinafter 
“Br. of Amici Curiae Technology Companies”). 
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it shifted the burden of flagging copyrighted content from users 
and onto  Google/YouTube, which is contrary to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).219  In enacting the 
DMCA, Congress sought to remove the obligation of service 
providers to monitor their services for infringement.220  The 
DMCA system sought, through the use of a notice-and-
takedown process, to require users to provide notice of specific 
instances of infringement in order to prompt a service provider 
to take down the identified infringements.221  The Garcia 
opinion achieves the opposite by requiring Google/YouTube to 
monitor the daily uploads to its website for potential 
infringements. 
The Garcia injunction is also contrary to precedent from 
the Ninth Circuit.  In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,222 
the Ninth Circuit held that an online service provider may face 
liability for failure to take “simple measures” after it has actual 
knowledge that specific infringing material is on its system.223  
This standard cannot operate in the face of the injunction 
issued in Garcia because proactive monitoring and filtering of 
online content are not “simple measures.”224  The measures 
imposed in Garcia were formidable challenges, and even 
sophisticated services would stumble in compliance efforts.225 
In addition, even though content recognition tools exist, 
the most sophisticated of these tools have technical flaws.226  To 
be safe, a service provider must divert employees manually to 
search and review material on its system continuously.227  
Lastly, online services are not editors of their users’ work.  Nor 
should YouTube even be expected to monitor for potential 
infringements considering the volume of content uploaded to 
its website on a daily basis.228 
 
 219.  Id. at 4. 
 220.  Id. at 5. 
 221.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi). 
 222.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 223.  Id. at 729. 
 224.  Br. of Amici Curiae Technology Companies at 9. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  YouTube is located in 70 countries and across 76 languages and millions 
of people are subscribing daily.  See Statistics, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html.  100 hours of video are 
uploaded to YouTube every minute.  Id.  80% of YouTube’s traffic comes from 
outside of the United States.  Id. 
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For the above reasons, the Ninth Circuit erred in 
assigning Garcia a copyright interest, erred in its work for hire 
analysis, and failed to recognize the impracticalities posed by 
its opinion. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
This proposal will first outline the suggested test for 
actors/actresses claiming authorship of a motion picture.  This 
test will then be applied to three hypotheticals, which will 
demonstrate the flexibility of this proposed test. 
A. The Test 
The proposal suggested in this Comment is a test for 
authorship in the context of motion pictures.  The test is an 
extension of the Aalmuhammed “master mind” test229 and 
applies solely to actors and actresses who do not qualify as an 
employee under the work for hire doctrine.230 
The test is as follows: 
An actor/actress claiming copyright authorship 
under Title 17 of the United States Code section 
102(a) has the burden of proving that he or she acted 
as the “master mind” of the motion picture by 
exercising artistic and production control over both 
his or her character and of the motion picture as a 
whole. 
Whether an individual was the master mind or has 
production control should turn on the following: (1) the role of 
the actor/actress within the motion picture; (2) the significance 
of that role within the motion picture; (3) the level of control 
and discretion afforded to the actor/actress in conveying his or 
her role; and (4) the level of control afforded to the actor/actress 
in production of the motion picture as a whole. 
The first factor is a necessary threshold factual inquiry 
that determines the individual’s role in the underlying motion 
picture.  This factor is not dispositive, but is highly probative 
to the extent that the individual is not a lead actor within the 
 
 229.  See supra note 166. 
 230.  This test does not apply to individuals not featured in a motion picture 
as an actor or actress because that issue was not before the court in Garcia.  This 
test only applies to an actor or actress who claims authorship in a film based on 
his or her performance in said film. 
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underlying motion picture.  This factor is important because if 
the individual is a mere “extra” or not heavily featured in the 
motion picture, he or she should face a higher burden with 
respect to factors two, three, and four.  However, it is not 
dispositive if the individual is a lead actor in the motion 
picture, but it is informative to the extent that it is more likely 
that a lead actor may qualify as the master mind of a motion 
picture under this test.231 
The second factor addresses Jules Jordan Video to the 
extent that it gauges the individual’s level of contribution to 
the motion picture.232  Courts applying this test should look for 
a level of involvement that resembles Jules Jordan Video’s 
“one-man-shop” analogy: an individual who produced, directed, 
contributed to the script, and acted.233 
The third factor addresses the Feist concern of whether an 
alleged creative contribution is the product of the actor/actress 
or the product of a third party such as the writer, director, or 
producer.234  This factor is highly dispositive.  If the 
performance is being dictated by an external force such as a 
producer, director, or a script—like the Kansas Corporation 
Commission in Feist235—then the copyright claim of the actor/
actress should fail because the material does not originate from 
the purported author, i.e., the actor/actress.236  A highly 
informative fact pertaining to this factor is whether the 
screenplay or director mandated the performance of the actor/
actress or whether the actor/actress was afforded the 
discretion to carry out his or her character.  This inquiry would 
ensure that the actor is truly “liv[ing] his part inwardly”237 and 
applying an “external embodiment,”238 triggering the requisite 
creative contribution needed to sustain a copyright claim.  This 
 
 231.  Aalmuhammed suggests this inquiry is relevant.  See Aalmuhammed v. 
Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that the role of the 
individual, specifically whether they are the “star” is relevant because the “star” 
is possibly the master mind of the motion picture). 
 232.  See supra notes 196–99. 
 233.  See Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1150 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 234.  See supra notes 55–57 (arguing that Rural’s creative contribution was 
actually dictated by state law and not by Rural’s decision to alphabetize names 
in the white pages). 
 235.  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). 
 236.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 237.  Garcia, 766 F.3d at 934.  See also supra notes 135–36. 
 238.  Garcia, 766 F.3d at 934.  See also supra notes 135–36. 
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fact also ensures that the performance is truly an “independent 
creation”239 of the actor/actress claiming authorship. 
The final factor gauges the level of control of the actor over 
the motion picture as a whole.  This final factor protects a 
motion picture from being dissected into a patchwork of 
overlapping property claims.  This factor is relevant because if 
an actor is found to be an author, said actor can dictate the 
licensing and distribution of the entire motion picture.  With 
that in mind, the individual should have contributed to the 
artistic and production decisions of the motion picture as a 
whole.  This factor, like the third, is highly dispositive.  
However, a strong level of control and discretion under factor 
three should overcome a weaker level of control under factor 
four.  Conversely, a moderate display of control and discretion 
under factor three may be bolstered by a strong display of 
control under factor four. 
B. Hypothetical One 
Assume an individual is cast as a substitute teacher in a 
motion picture about a high school football team from Texas 
that plays through a season of adversity and wins the state 
championship.  This motion picture is 140 minutes, and the 
individual occupies one scene lasting approximately seven 
minutes.  Assume this individual was given a script, which 
provided the actor with three pages of lines with the following 
instruction: 
Your character—the substitute teacher—must abide 
by the following script.  Improvisation of your 
character is not allowed.  The substitute teacher is a 
pushover who allows football players to show up 
late, turn in assignments after due dates, and 
provides special treatment to student athletes.  In 
performing your character, please perform within 
these boundaries. 
Applying the above test, the court should first conclude 
that this individual was cast as a non-lead substitute teacher 
in a motion picture that is primarily about high school football.  
The individual also occupied only seven minutes of screen time.  
Consequently, this individual would face a high burden in 
demonstrating control and discretion under the third and 
 
 239.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
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fourth factors.  Turning to the second factor, the court should 
conclude that this individual’s role is not significant to the 
overall motion picture, which is about high school football in 
Texas.  However, a strong showing of the third and fourth 
factors can overcome a weak showing of the first and second 
factors. 
Turning to the third factor, this individual had no 
discretion or control over his character because the script and 
producer dictated his character’s behavior.  As a result, his 
creative contribution was dictated by an external force and 
should not be found to be original.  Finally, turning to the forth 
factor, this individual had no control over production or over 
the motion picture as a whole. 
Therefore, this individual has a weak claim of authorship 
of this motion picture. 
C. Hypothetical Two 
For this hypothetical, assume an individual is cast as a 
high school football coach in a motion picture about a high 
school football team from Texas who plays through a season of 
adversity and wins the state championship.  This motion 
picture is 140 minutes, and said individual appears in 
numerous scenes occupying approximately seventy percent of 
the motion picture.  Assume the director or producer told this 
individual that he will be provided with a general outline of his 
scenes, but that the actor can improvise how his character will 
perform within each scene.  For example, one suggested outline 
is: 
Coach holds his first team meeting.  The goal of this 
meeting is for the coach to introduce himself.  This is 
the coach’s first season, and his goal in his first 
meeting is to establish total control over the players 
and program.  The coach is aggressive and runs a 
military style meeting. 
Applying the proposed test, the court should first conclude 
that this individual was cast as a lead in this motion picture as 
the head coach in a motion picture primarily about high school 
football.  This individual also appeared in seventy percent of 
scenes in the motion picture, demonstrating his character’s 
significance.  Turning to the second factor, the court would 
conclude that this individual’s role is significant to the overall 
motion picture.  The high school football coach is at the core of 
4_FERRARI FINAL 3/25/2016  10:59 PM 
2016] GARCIA V. GOOGLE 409 
a movie about high school football in Texas and is critical to 
the motion picture’s success. 
Turning to the third factor, this individual had total 
discretion and control over his character’s performance.  
Though the individual’s scenes were dictated by the script 
outline, the individual was afforded discretion as to how his 
character would demonstrate his control over his player 
meeting.  As a result, the individual could have applied many 
acting techniques in carrying out his scenes and was required 
to choose which techniques would best reflect his character.  
Accordingly, this individual should be found to have a strong 
showing of control because he implemented his creative 
contribution in a way that was not dictated by an external 
force.  Lastly, we do not have facts suggesting that this 
individual controlled the production of the movie as a whole, 
but a strong showing of control and discretion under the third 
factor can overcome a weak display of control under the forth 
factor. 
As a result of the above analysis, this individual has a 
strong claim of authorship of this motion picture. 
D. Hypothetical Three 
For this hypothetical, assume an individual is cast as a 
high school football quarterback in a motion picture about a 
high school football team from Texas that plays through a 
season of adversity and wins the state championship.  This 
motion picture is 140 minutes, and said individual appears in 
numerous scenes occupying approximately forty percent of the 
motion picture.  Assume the director or producer told this 
individual that some of his scenes will be provided by a general 
outline, allowing this individual to improvise how his character 
will perform within each scene.  However, other scenes will be 
dictated by a script and will not allow improvisation.  
Moreover, this particular individual also played high school 
football in Texas and thus is being asked to contribute to the 
general direction of the motion picture as a whole in order to 
replicate the most realistic portrayal of high school football in 
Texas. 
Applying the proposed test, the court should first conclude 
that this individual was cast as a lead because he is the 
quarterback of a high school football team in a motion picture 
primarily about high school football.  Turning to the second 
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factor, the court would conclude that this individual’s role is 
significant to the overall motion picture.  The quarterback of a 
high school football team is at the core of a movie about high 
school football in Texas and is critical to the motion picture’s 
success.  Moreover, the individual appeared in forty percent of 
the film, demonstrating his character’s significance. 
Turning to the third factor, this individual had some 
control and discretion over his character’s performance.  Other 
scenes were dictated by a script and did not afford the 
individual any control or discretion.  Thus, this individual 
should be found to have moderately implemented his creative 
contribution.  Lastly, the fourth factor bolsters this individual’s 
authorship claim because he was asked to contribute to the 
general portrayal of high school football in the motion picture 
as a whole.  This fact would help this individual overcome his 
scenes that were scripted, a fact that would cut against his 
copyright claim under the third factor. 
This individual has a strong claim of authorship of this 
motion picture. 
As these hypotheticals demonstrate, actors and actresses 
are often retained for a variety of roles within a motion picture 
and are sometimes bound by scripted scenes or afforded 
maximum discretion in how their performance will be 
portrayed.  The above test is ideal because it can be applied 
flexibly to the wide range of circumstances surrounding the 
retention, performance, and contribution of an actor/actress. 
The above test is also ideal for this particular legal issue 
because it: (1) aligns with the heightened requirements of 
authorship articulated in Aalmuhammed; (2) ensures that an 
actor/actress demonstrates artistic control over his or her 
alleged independent creation; (3) protects the true author’s 
exclusive rights to the motion picture by heightening the 
burden required for an actor/actress to be deemed an author, 
which would allow said actor/actress to control licensing and 
distribution of said motion picture;240 and (4) provides an actor/
actress with a remedy in the event his or her contribution truly 
exceeds the bounds of his or her performance, warranting the 
 
 240.  See supra note 189.  Alternatively, the true author is protected because 
the actor/actress must also demonstrate control over the motion picture as a 
whole. 
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right of copyright authorship.241 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, Youssef used Garcia as a pawn to further his 
political beliefs.  As reprehensible as Youssef’s deceit was, 
Garcia was not an author of the Innocence of Muslims because 
her five-second appearance fails to demonstrate significant 
creative contribution and artistic control.  The Garcia opinion 
had the potential to adversely affect not only United States 
copyright law, but also Hollywood and companies engaged in 
content streaming.  Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
corrected the Garcia opinion through an en banc proceeding, 
considerable debate regarding the authorship of supporting 
cast members remains.  Thus, this Comment seeks to 
introduce a novel test for evaluating future copyright claims 
brought by an actor/actress. 
For these reasons, the test for copyright authorship in the 
context of a motion picture should focus on the level of control 
and discretion of the actor/actress over both his or her role and 
the motion picture as a whole.  The proposed test avoids 
improper grants of authorship while simultaneously providing 
a remedy for an actor/actress who demonstrates a level of 
involvement in a film that warrants copyright authorship. 
 
 241.  For the reasons discussed in this Comment, it is critical to tighten the 
requirements for authorship in the context of a motion picture.  However, 
Aalmuhammed nonetheless recognizes that the “star” of a movie could possibly 
be deemed an author.  See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 
2000).  For that reason, the proposed test provides a remedy for an actor/actress 
who demonstrates a level of involvement in a film that warrants copyright 
authorship. 
